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I. INTRODUCTION
Art prices are reaching spectacular heights. Current estimates place
annual worldwide retail sales between ten billion and forty billion dol-
lars;' each auction season, bidders smash previous price records. For ex-
ample, at a May 9, 1989 Sotheby's auction, a buyer paid 47.9 million
1. See Lee, Greed Is Not Just for Profit, FORBES, Apr. 18, 1988, at 65, 68.
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dollars for Picasso's self-portrait "Yo-Picasso"; Gaugin's "Mata Mau
(In Olden Times)" sold for 24.2 million dollars.2 The next day at Chris-
tie's, an investor purchased a Monet for 14.3 million dollars, twice its
estimated value.' The inflated prices have inspired people without a
prior interest in art to conceive a sudden passion for collecting by any
available means.4 As a potentially lucrative, multibillion dollar business,
art collecting has attracted a full range of unscrupulous individuals.
5
Although it is difficult to assemble accurate art theft statistics, ex-
perts estimate that approximately 53,0006 worldwide thefts occur annu-
ally, with losses valued at between five billion and ten billion dollars.7
The increasing magnitude of art theft has raised concerns with regard
to the difficulty of locating stolen art; experts estimate that recoveries
are as low as two percent.8 An international passion for acquiring po-
tentially valuable artworks contributes to the problem of recovering
stolen art.9 Buyers in the high demand market rarely probe the origins
of desirable pieces.' 0 Thieves frequently smuggle and trade stolen art
internationally through organized rings of brokers and middlemen."
Smuggled pieces eventually filter into otherwise legitimate markets. 12 A
cooling off period after the theft may complicate recovery attempts fur-
ther.13 Not surprisingly, locating and recovering a particular piece of
stolen art in this environment may require several years.
14
2. Dickey, Missing Masterpieces, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1989, at 65.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. DeGraw, Art Theft in Perspective, 31 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1987).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Heisting Buyers on Their Own Petards, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 15, 1989, at 16.
8. The International Association of Art Security has estimated that recoveries of stolen art
are approximately 2%, while the publication Art Gallery has estimated 5% recovery, and the In-
ternational Foundation of Art Research has estimated 13% recovery. DeGraw, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limita-
tions, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1122, 1124 (1980).
10. Id.
11. See Note, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 909, 910-11 (1989).
12. Id. at 910. Police for some time have speculated the existence of large international
stolen art networks capable of transferring works among several continents through complex chan-
nels. The ease with which valuable artworks find their way to legitimate markets supports this
proposition. For example, Roman coins and Byzantine ivories valued in excess of $1 million origi-
nally stolen from an Italian museum passed through at least four art dealers before their arrival in
a New York auction gallery. Similarly, paintings housed in Holland museums were stolen in 1978,
and made available to unsuspecting dealers in Los Angeles less than 24 hours later. See Comment,
supra note 9, at 1124 n.9.
13. See Dickey, supra note 2, at 68 (stating that canvases may be stolen by criminal organi-
zations that withhold works from the market for 100 years if necessary, provided that the networks
have no immediate need for cash).
14. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1124 n.12 (observing that the lack of a cohesive interna-
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The delays inherent in the process of locating and identifying
stolen art not only hinder recovery efforts by victims of theft, but also
plague innocent art purchasers. In a market in which the origin of a
particular piece of work is difficult to determine, the statute of limita-
tions historically has been the good faith purchaser's primary shield
against liability.15 Unfortunately, inconsistent judicial interpretations of
when limitations periods begin to run have generated considerable un-
certainty regarding the rights of both good faith purchasers and true
owners.16 No consistent guidelines instruct good faith purchasers on
when their legal rights to property vest or true owners on their requisite
legal obligations in replevin actions. 17
This Recent Development examines the emerging duty of due dili-
gence that some jurisdictions impose on owners of lost or stolen art in
replevin actions. 18 In jurisdictions that apply the due diligence require-
ment, the limitations period begins to run when the true owner,
through diligent search, locates or reasonably should have located the
artwork or its possessor.' 9 This Recent Development concludes that the
recent district court decision in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.20 properly
places the onus of due diligence on the true owner of stolen art. Finally,
this Recent Development proposes that the Goldberg rationale should
entrench firmly the due diligence requirement in stolen art cases, and
that continued judicial application of this duty will provide long-needed
uniformity in this area of the law.2'
tional enforcement effort, as well as a fragmented network available for reporting art thefts, are
primary causes for such delays).
15. The delays owners of stolen art face in locating their property often push this event
beyond the running of relatively short limitations periods. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1125.
Typically, expiration of the limitations period not only extinguishes the owner's right to sue, but
divests the owner of title in the property, vesting good title in the innocent purchaser. Id.
16. See id. at 1126.
17. The common-law action of replevin allowed owners to recover specific lost or stolen per-
sonal property. In some states this form of action is known as either replevin, detinue, claim and
delivery, bail, or sequestration, but "replevin" is used as a generic label for all actions to recover
the property itself. In contrast, the owner seeks monetary damages for unlawful possession of per-
sonal property in "conversion" actions. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.13,
at 399, § 5.14, at 403 (1973).
18. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'g 658 F. Supp. 688
(S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
Courts have justified imposing a due diligence requirement only on owners of stolen art as
opposed to any owners of stolen property because art owners are uniquely situated to mount an
effective search. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109 (stating that owners of stolen art have a better
chance of recovering lost items than most owners of stolen property).
19. See Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1387-88.
20. Id. at 1374.
21. In replevin actions for stolen art, the law of the state having the most contacts to the
1990] 1841
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II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN REPLEVIN ACTIONS
A. Background
Statutes of limitations originated from the belief that certain time
constraints are necessary to make prosecution of a claim both fair and
efficient.2 The punitive concept underlying limitations periods is that
parties should be deprived of the right to legal redress if they fail to
bring their claims to court promptly.23 Statutes of limitations implicitly
condemn unnecessary delay in the filing of an action as an undue bur-
den on defendants.24
Consistent with many civil actions, claimants must file their suits
to reclaim stolen property within the applicable statute of limitations
period.25 All statutes dictate when the limitations period begins to run;
typically the period initiates upon the accrual of the cause of action.26
Determining when accrual occurs in replevin actions, however, presents
some difficulties. Most statutes are disturbingly vague about accrual
and implicitly delegate the determination of this issue to the courts.27
As a result, two distinct judicial interpretations of accrual have de-
artwork's subsequent purchase will govern. Because artwork often is transported among several
states or nations, the owner's replevin action may be controlled by the unfamiliar laws of a foreign
jurisdiction. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
22. One commentator stated: "A defendant who does not imagine that any claim may be
brought against him is not only'likely to have parted with evidence that he at one time had but is
also likely to have lost track of evidence which at one time he could have obtained." Williams,
Limitation Periods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881, 884 (1973).
23. Comment, supra note 9, at 1127.
24. See id. As one New Jersey court has stated:
Statutes of limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they stimu-
late activity and punish negligence and promote repose by giving security and stability to
human affairs. They are intended to run against those who are neglectful of their rights and
who fall to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement thereof.
Leake v. Bullock, 104 N.J. Super. 309, 313, 250 A.2d 27, 29 (App. Div. 1969) (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court also has noted: "[Statutes of limitations] are founded upon the
general experience of mankind that claims, which are valid, are not usually allowed to remain
neglected. The lapse of years without any attempt to enforce a demand creates, therefore, a pre-
sumption against its original validity, or that it has ceased to subsist." Riddlesbarger v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868).
25. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1125.
26. See United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 418 (1938); Grayson v. Harris, 279 U.S. 300,
304 (1929); Merritt v. Economy Dep't Store, 125 Ind. App. 560, 128 N.E.2d 279 (App. Ct. 1955).
27. See, e.g., Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
312 (West 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-1 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West Supp.
1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (West 1988). Commenting on legislative deference in this regard,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Fernandi stated: "[T]he legislatures have not at all expressed
themselves on the matter, preferring to leave to judicial interpretation and application the rather
obscure statutory phraseology that the plaintiff's proceeding shall be instituted within a stated
period after his cause of action 'shall have accrued.'" Fernandi, 35 N.J. at 439, 173 A.2d at 279
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (West 1960)).
1842
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veloped in replevin actions brought against good faith purchasers.28
Some courts have held that accrual occurs at the time the innocent pur-
chaser takes wrongful possession. 9 Other jurisdictions maintain that
accrual does not occur until the owner makes a demand for return of
the property.30 The determination of when the cause of action ac-
crued-and the limitations period consequently began to
run-frequently determines the outcome in a suit for the recovery of
stolen art. Therefore, courts should evaluate carefully the consequences
and the rationale of selecting one point of accrual over another.
B. Accrual upon Wrongful Possession
Many states regard acquisition of property by a bona fide pur-
chaser as an assertion of an adverse claim so detrimental to the owner's
dominion that demand for the property's return is not a prerequisite
for commencement of the limitations period.' In these jurisdictions,
the limitations period begins to run upon wrongful possession. 2 While
this rule, which considers the good faith purchaser to be in unlawful
possession upon receipt of the property 3 rather than upon demand and
refusal, 4 seems to favor the true owner, the rule actually benefits the
good faith purchaser in replevin actions.
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to afford the good faith
28. Compare Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 81, 68 S.W.2d 756, 759
(1934); Galvin v. Bacon, 11 Me. 28, 29-31 (1831); Trudo v. Anderson, 10 Mich. 357, 368-70 (1862);
Adams v. Coon, 36 Okla. 644, 646, 129 P. 851, 852 (1913); and Riesinger's Jewelers, Inc. v. Rober-
son, 582 P.2d 409, 412 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (all stating that accrual occurs upon wrongful posses-
sion) with Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc., 221 Ind. 47, 50, 46 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1943); Torian v.
McClure, 83 Ind. 310, 312 (1882); and Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S. 2d 43, 44 (App.
Div. 1964) (all stating that accrual occurs upon demand for return of property rather than upon
wrongful possession).
29. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
31. See Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n, 253 Ky. at 74, 68 S.W.2d at 756; Galvin, 11 Me. at 28.
32. These jurisdictions rationalize that because an innocent purchaser obtains possession
from a wrongdoer, the purchaser's possession is tortious. See, e.g., Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n, 253
Ky. at 74, 68 S.W.2d at 756; Galvin, 11 Me. at 28; Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Or. 539, 16 P. 631 (1888).
33. Under the majority rule, the good faith purchaser is liable to the original owner in tort
immediately upon conversion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 (1965). The highly technical
tort of conversion is so complicated that it seems to defy definition. Courts generally have de-
scribed the tort as "the unlawful and wrongful exercise of dominion, ownership, or control by one
person over property of another, to the exclusion of the exercise of the same rights by the owner,
either permanently or for an indefinite time." Pugh v. Hassell, 206 Okla. 290, 291, 242 P.2d 701,
702 (1952) (quoting Griffith v. McBride, 188 Okla. 227, 228, 108 P.2d 109, 110 (1940)). Generally,
replevin and conversion are alternative actions for a wrongful possession of property, differing only
in the relief sought. In replevin the plaintiff seeks return of the property itself, while in conversion
actions the plaintiff seeks monetary damages in lieu of the property. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410
F.2d 701, 706-07 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
34. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
purchaser security against stale claims.35 Because the time period dur-
ing which a true owner may bring an action against the purchaser com-
mences when the cause of action accrues,36 the purchaser wants accrual
to occur as soon as possible. Early accrual not only expedites the point
at which the innocent purchaser can be secure in possession, but also
accelerates the time that such purchaser can be assured of legal title to
the property. 37 Consequently, in jurisdictions in which demand and re-
fusal are unnecessary to begin the running of the limitations period,
good faith purchasers effectively are favored over true owners in re-
plevin actions for stolen art, despite the legal characterization of the
innocent purchaser as a wrongdoer.
C. Demand Requirement
Other jurisdictions require that an owner's demand for return of
the property be refused before an owner may bring a replevin action
against a good faith purchaser.38 The asserted justification for the de-
mand requirement is that an innocent purchaser for value and without
knowledge of the theft cannot, without a demand, be deemed a wrong-
doer merely by acquiring property.3 9 This legal principle not only
shields bona fide purchasers from liability for conversion, but also pre-
vents real owners from bringing replevin actions unless they first give
the holder an opportunity to return the property.40
The good faith purchaser's protection, however, is illusory.41 Practi-
cally, the demand requirement in a replevin action prolongs the dura-
tion of an owner's right to sue a good faith purchaser; the statute of
limitations commences only after the real owner has located the stolen
35. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
37. As one commentator has stated:
While in form these statutes merely limit the right of the owner to bring legal proceedings to
repossess his property or to recover its value in case of conversion, all but universally in the
United States the expiration of the statutory period has the effect, not only of barring the
legal remedy, but also of extinguishing the owner's title and of transferring it to the adverse
possessor or possessors.
R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4.1, at 33 (3d ed. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
38. See supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text.
39. See Atlas Assurance Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn. 188, 194, 183 A. 690, 693 (1936); Butler v.
Wolf Sussman, Inc., 221 Ind. 47, 50, 46 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1943); Gillett v. Roberts, 47 N.Y. 28, 34
(1874).
40. Presumptively, individuals who have come into possession of property lawfully, which
they are not entitled to retain, will surrender it upon proper demand and should be afforded the
opportunity to do so without being subjected to a lawsuit. Butler, 221 Ind. at 50, 46 N.E.2d at 243.
41. As the court noted in DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1056 (1988): "Until demand and refusal, the purchaser in good faith is not considered a
wrongdoer, even though this rule somewhat anomalously affords the owner more time to sue a
good-faith purchaser than a thief." 836 F.2d at 106 (citation omitted).
1844 [Vol. 43:1839
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art and demanded its return.42 Although the purpose of the demand
requirement is to protect innocent purchasers, this rule actually favors
true owners in suits to recover stolen art.4
III. EMERGENCE OF THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT
If a state does not impose a demand requirement, an individual
who innocently purchases stolen art is implicated in tortious behavior."
Alternatively, states that require demand view the purchaser as truly
innocent.45 Despite conflicting policy rationales underlying the legal sta-
tus of a good faith purchaser, judicial recognition of the unique circum-
stances in stolen art cases has led to careful scrutiny of the effect of
limitations periods in replevin actions for stolen art.46 New York, as a
major international art center and an adherent to the demand require-
ment in replevin actions, 47 frequently has been the site for legal dis-
putes over the ownership of stolen art.48 The Second Circuit, in
applying New York's demand requirement, has been at the forefront in
developing this area of the law. 9
New York is the center of art trade in the United States, with over
five hundred private art dealers and auction houses in New York City
alone.50 Sotheby's and Christie's, the world's two largest international
art houses, have their American headquarters in New York City.51 Not
surprisingly, the sheer magnitude of art transactions occurring in New
York52 has required this state to cultivate legal principles unique to re-
covery actions for stolen art.53 As a result, New York has departed from
42. Id.
43. See Note, supra note 11, at 916 n.54 (stating that the demand requirement works prima-
rily to the advantage of original owner-plaintiffs, not defendants in stolen art cases).
44. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103.
47. In New York accrual occurs only upon demand and refusal. This rule is known as the
"substantive demand requirement." See Note, supra note 11, at 916. New York also has a proce-
dural demand rule that applies when demand is not a substantive element of the cause of action.
Id. at 916 n.56. The procedural demand rule has very limited application in New York. See Kunst-
sammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing J. WEINSTEIN, H.
KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE T 206.01, at 2-159 (1980)).
48. See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 65-107 and accompanying text.
50. See Note, supra note 11, at 909 (citing Art Now Gallery Guide, Dec. 1988, at 25-78,
which lists 541 art dealers and auction houses in Manhattan alone).
51. See Lee, supra note 1, at 68.
52. Sotheby's and Christie's alone had combined sales in excess of $2.2 billion in art sales in
1987. Id.
53. In addition to demand, true owners now must show due diligence in locating and claim-
ing their artworks before they can successfully recover stolen pieces. See infra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text.
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its traditional demand requirement by adopting a duty of due diligence
in these cases.54 New York's due diligence requirement recently has
commanded the attention of at least one other jurisdiction, perhaps
serving as the foundation for a more uniform interpretation of accrual
issues in stolen art cases.5 5 An examination of New York case law pro-
vides insight into the emergence of the due diligence requirement and
its potential application in other jurisdictions. 6
A. New York
1. Menzel v. List57
The leading case applying New York's traditional demand require-
ment to an action for the recovery of stolen artwork is Menzel v. List. 8
Erna Menzel, the owner of a Chagall painting, left the work in Belgium
when he fled during the 1940 German invasion.59 The whereabouts of
the painting remained a mystery until it resurfaced in New York
twenty years later.60 In 1962 Menzel noticed a reproduction of the Cha-
gall in an art book and sued to recover the painting from Albert List,
who had purchased the piece in good faith from a New York art
gallery."'
The New York Appellate Division rejected List's contention that
the suit was untimely and held that the statute of limitations begins to
run only after the original owner locates the artwork, demands its re-
turn from the bona fide purchaser, and is refused.6 2 Because of the de-
mand requirement, a twenty-year lapse of time between the art theft
and relocation of the painting did not bar the suit.6 3 In effect, Menzel
established a precedent favoring the original owners of lost artwork de-
spite the assertion that the demand requirement protects good faith
purchasers. 4
54. See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text.
55. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
56. For a detailed account of the development of the due diligence requirement in New York,
see Note, supra note 11.
57. 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1964) (affirming trial court's denial of defend-
ant's motion to dismiss). The facts and procedural history of the case as it proceeded following this
affirmance are recorded in Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
modified, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), modification rev'd, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
58. 22 A.D.2d at 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
59. Menzel, 24 N.Y.2d at 93, 246 N.E.2d at 743, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 94, 246 N.E.2d at 743, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
62. Menzel, 22 A.D.2d at 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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2. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon6 5
Two Second Circuit decisions 6 recently have limited the protection
granted to original owners in Menzel. In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar
v. Elicofon,6 7 the first of those cases, a German art museum sought to
recover two Albrecht Dtirer paintings that disappeared during World
War II.1. The paintings had been on exhibit at the museum until 1943,
but were moved to a nearby castle for safekeeping during the War.6 9
The paintings disappeared during American occupation of the castle in
1945.70 The director of the museum reported the disappearance and im-
mediately began to search for the paintings.7 '
Edward Elicofon purchased the D(irer paintings in 1946 from an
ex-serviceman who claimed he had purchased the artwork while in Ger-
many. 2 In 1966 Elicofon discovered that the paintings were listed in a
book describing various stolen artworks, and he subsequently made
public his possession of the Dtirers.73 The German museum sued to re-
cover the paintings when it learned that they were in Elicofon's
possession.74
The district court rejected Elicofon's assertion that the cause of ac-
tion accrued in 1946, upon Elicofon's purchase, and that the suit, there-
fore, was untimely.75 The district court instead held that the statute of
limitations commenced only after a demand had been made and re-
fused-in this case, in 1966.76 The district court cautioned, however,
that a party may not delay making a demand unreasonably to postpone
commencement of the limitations period.7 Elicofon claimed that absent
a diligent search for the paintings, the museum had delayed its demand
unreasonably, implying that the museum must satisfy a due diligence
requirement.78 Although the district court stated that the museum
65. 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'g 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
66. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'g 658 F. Supp. 688
(S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1150.
67. 678 F.2d at 1150.
68. Id. at 1152.
69. Id. at 1155.
70. Id. at 1155-56.
71. Id. at 1156.
72. Id.
73. Id. Apparently, Elicofon had the paintings framed and hung in his home where they
remained until 1966. Id.
74. Id.
75. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 848.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 849 (citing Heide v. Glidden Buick Corp., 188 Misc. 198, 67 N.Y.S.2d 905 (App.
Term 1947) (holding that a demand cannot be postponed by a plaintiff indefinitely because of the




made a diligent, but fruitless, effort to locate the paintings,79 it side-
stepped the issue of whether New York law might require due diligence
on the part of the true owner.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed and explicitly rejected the
argument that New York's demand requirement implied a duty of due
diligence.80 The Second Circuit followed Menzel's strict interpretation
of the demand requirement and reiterated New York's implicit practice
of favoring original owners in actions to recover stolen property.8 Five
years later, in DeWeerth v. Baldinger,82 the Second Circuit re-examined
the Elicofon district court's implication that a true owner of stolen art
has a duty to search diligently for the property.
3. DeWeerth v. Baldinger3
In DeWeerth v. Baldinger the owner of a Monet painting, Gerada
DeWeerth, shipped the artwork to southern Germany for safekeeping
during World War 11.84 The painting disappeared following the quarter-
ing of American soldiers in the home during 1945.85 DeWeerth reported
the loss to the military government in 1946.86 During subsequent years,
she made inquiries of an art expert and her attorney concerning the
theft. In 1957 DeWeerth reported the loss of the Monet to the
Bundeskriminalamt, the West German federal bureau of investigation.
These efforts to find the painting were unsuccessful and search efforts
effectively were abandoned after 1957.87
In the meantime, the Monet had reappeared in the international
art market.88 In 1956 the Wildenstein art gallery of New York acquired
the Monet on consignment from an art dealer in Geneva.89 In 1957 the
79. Id. at 849-50. In 1945 the museum reported the Ddirers missing to the Land Office of
Education. In the same year, the government submitted information to the Kaiser Freidrich Mu-
seum, which in turn informed United States military authorities of the looting. Between 1946 and
1948, the director of the Kunstsammlungen also contacted the Bavarian National Museum and
Soviet Military Administration. During the early 1950s the United States State Department was
informed of the loss and disseminated information to various international agencies. Id. at 850.
The district court concluded that the efforts to locate the paintings, following many channels in
the face of insurmountable obstacles, reflected a continuous and diligent search. Id. at 852.
80. See Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1163-64.
81. Id.
82. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'g 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988).
83. 836 F.2d at 103.
84. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 690.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 691.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. In December of 1956 the New York City art gallery of Wildenstein & Co. acquired the
Monet from Francois Reichenbach, an art dealer in Geneva, Switzerland. From December 1956
1848 [Vol. 43:1839
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gallery sold the painting to defendant Baldinger. 0 Baldinger twice
loaned the painting for public display in New York.91 Four published
references to the painting accompanied these displays.2 The publicity
enabled DeWeerth to trace the stolen Monet to Baldinger in December
1982. 93 After Baldinger refused DeWeerth's demand for return of the
painting, DeWeerth filed suit for its recovery in February 1983.9-
Baldinger claimed that DeWeerth's lack of diligence in locating and
claiming the painting and the unreasonableness of the delay in com-
mencing the action barred the suit.9 5 The district court, relying on
Elicofon, did not decide whether the original owner had a duty of due
diligence as a prerequisite to a demand for the return of the painting.9 "
Instead, the court focused on the reasonableness of the delay and deter-
mined that timeliness grounds did not bar DeWeerth's action. The
court concluded that, despite the passage of time, DeWeerth's efforts
were substantial and the delay was reasonable.9
until June 1957 the painting was in the possession of Wildenstein where it was presented to pro-
spective buyers. Id.
90. Id. Edith Marks Baldinger purchased the Monet in June 1957 for $30,900 in good faith
and without knowledge of any adverse claim. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105. At the time of the law-
suit, the painting was estimated to be worth over $500,000. Id. at 104.
91. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691. Baldinger exhibited the Monet at a benefit held in the
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City, from October 29 to November 1, 1957. Id. The painting
again was displayed during a Wildenstein art gallery exhibition entitled "One Hundred Years of
Impressionism" held April 2 to May 9, 1970, also in New York City. Id.
92. Id. The published works in which references appeared are: (1) R. WALTER, S. CRUSSARD &
FOUNDATION WILDENSTEIN, 1 CLAUDE MoNEr: BIBLIOGRAPHIE ET CATALOGUE RAISONNE, 1840-1881
(1974); (2) WILDENSTEIN GALLERY, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF IMPRESSIONISM, A TRIBUTE TO DURAND-
RUEL, A LOAN EXHIBITION (1970); (3) D. WILDENSTEIN, MONET. IMPRESSIONS (1967); (4) WALDORF-
ASTORIA HOTEL, FESTIVAL OF ART (1957). Id.
93. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105. Catalogue Raisonne indicated that Wildenstein sold the Mo-
net in 1957 and exhibited the painting in 1970. Id.
In 1982 DeWeerth requested that Wildenstein identify the current owner. Wildenstein re-
fused, resulting in a lawsuit brought under N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 3102(c) (McKinney 1970) for
"disclosure to aid in bringing an action." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106. In December 1982 the court
ruled in favor of DeWeerth, compelling Wildenstein to identify Baldinger. Id.
94. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106. DeWeerth demanded return of the Monet by letter dated
December 27, 1982. By letter dated February 1, 1983, Baldinger refused to cooperate. DeWeerth
filed a recovery action on February 16, 1983. Id.
95. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 694-95.
98. Id. The district court favorably viewed the efforts taken by DeWeerth to locate the paint-
ing following World War I. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. Finding these endeavors
"fruitless" although "diligent," the district court concluded that DeWeerth's failure to pursue the
Monet beyond 1957, until discovery of the whereabouts of the painting in a 1981 publication, was
reasonable. Contributing to the district court's characterization was the sympathetic image of
DeWeerth as an elderly individual, without the resources, knowledge, or experience of an institu-
tional collector, such as the government-owned art museum in Elicofon. Consequently, the district
court noted that DeWeerth did not have the means to muster a more credible search for the miss-
ing painting. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694-95.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed on the issue of due dili-
gence, holding that an owner's obligation to make a demand without
unreasonable delay implies an obligation to pursue the stolen property
diligently.9 The ostensible purpose of New York's demand require-
ment-to protect the good faith purchaser-persuaded the Second Cir-
cuit that the law implied such a duty.100 The court reasoned that the
due diligence requirement was necessary in order to allow a good faith
purchaser some security in ownership.' 01
The Second Circuit consequently re-evaluated DeWeerth's efforts
to locate the Monet under the newly articulated standard. 0 2 Whereas
the district court found DeWeerth's search to be substantial,0 3 the Sec-
ond Circuit characterized her attempts as minimal. 0 The Second Cir-
cuit found particularly troublesome the owner's failure to conduct any
search for twenty-four years. 05 Although the court implied that the due
diligence standard may require less substantial efforts by an individual
than an institutional owner, it observed that DeWeerth, a wealthy and
sophisticated art collector, could have mounted a more extensive inves-
tigation.10 6 Finding that DeWeerth did not satisfy her duty of due dili-
gence, the Second Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations barred
her claim to ownership of the artwork.10 7
99. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108. The Second Circuit gave three reasons for applying the due
diligence rule in stolen art cases: (1) New York's (alleged) policy of protecting the good faith pur-
chaser; (2) the general policies of repose and fairness to defendants favored a duty of due diligence;
and (3) the duty of due diligence was especially appropriate for stolen art, which is not likely to be
found by chance, but rather only by investigation. See Note, supra note 11, at 930-31.
100. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108-09. The court departed from the principle enunciated in
Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1964), which had protected true owners
in replevin actions for other property. The court apparently realized the need for a rule tailored to
the unique circumstances in stolen art cases.
101. In view of the policy of protecting good faith purchasers, the court stated: "A construc-
tion of the rule requiring due diligence in making a demand to include an obligation to make a
reasonable effort to locate the property will prevent unnecessary hardship to the good-faith pur-
chaser, the party intended to be protected." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
102. Id. at 110.
103. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694.
104. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111.
105. Id. at 112.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court contrasted this long period of inaction to the "continuous and diligent
search" following "many channels" in Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829




B. Indiana: Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.'0 8
After the Second Circuit implied a duty of due diligence under
New York law, Indiana also adopted this requirement. 0 9 During the
highly publicized case of Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,"10 the art world anx-
iously awaited a federal district court's interpretation of Indiana law on
this issue. Art experts anticipated that the outcome of this case would
establish important precedent by delineating the rights of both owners
and buyers of stolen artworks."'
Goldberg concerned a controversy surrounding the ownership of
four Byzantine mosaics originally affixed to a church in the village of
Lythrankomi, Cyprus, in 530 A.D." 2 In 1974 Turkish troops invaded
Cyprus and gained control of the northern regions of the island where
the mosaics were located.ll 3 Sometime between 1976 and 1979 someone
removed the mosaics from the church." 4 Neither the Republic of Cy-
prus nor the church authorized the removal or sale of the mosaics." 5
Upon learning that the mosaics were missing, the Republic of Cy-
prus contacted the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), informed it of the significance of the lost art,
and sought UNESCO's assistance in recovering the pieces."' The Re-
public of Cyprus also sought the assistance of several artistic and his-
torical associations for the purpose of disseminating information about
the missing mosaics. 17 In addition, Cyprus's Embassy in Washington,
D.C. routinely sent press releases and mailed information concerning
the general loss of Cyprus's cultural property and specifically the miss-
ing mosaics." 8 As a result of these efforts, the Republic of Cyprus re-
covered some minor antiquities and, more importantly, traced the
108. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1989, at C26, col. 5.
112. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1377.
113. Id. at 1378. As a result of the invasion, many villages, including Lythrankomi, were
vacated as citizens sought refuge in the southern regions still controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.
Since the invasion, citizens in the southern region generally have been denied access to occupied
northern Cyprus. Since that time, however, they have received reports that several churches and
national monuments in the occupied territory have been looted and destroyed. Id. at 1379.
114. Id. at 1379.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1380.
117. Some of these organizations included the International Council of Museums, the Inter-
national Council of Museums and Sites, and other European and American museums. Id.
118. Id.
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missing mosaics to Peg Goldberg, an Indianapolis art dealer." 9
Goldberg purchased the early Christian mosaics from an Amster-
dam art dealer in July 1988.120 The mosaics were transported to Ge-
neva, Switzerland, to be delivered to Goldberg. 121 Goldberg testified
that prior to consummation of the purchase, she inquired whether the
mosaics had been reported as stolen or missing and whether any appli-
cable treaties might prevent them from being imported into the United
States.'22 She further testified that she placed inquiries with the Inter-
national Foundation for Art Research in New York and UNESCO's of-
fice in Geneva. 23 In addition, Goldberg claimed she telephoned customs
offices in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey regard-
ing the proposed importation. 24 Satisfied that she would be able to
take legal possession of the mosaics, Goldberg finalized financing ar-
rangements and returned to the United States with the artwork in July
1988.125
In the fall of 1988 Goldberg contacted several prospective buyers. 26
As a result of these contacts, the Republic of Cyprus learned that the
mosaics were in Goldberg's possession in Indianapolis." 7 Upon demand
for return of the artwork and Goldberg's refusal, the Republic of Cy-
prus, in 1988, filed suit in Indiana's federal district court for the mosa-
ics' return. 28
The timeliness of the action was one of the primary issues before
the court. 29 Applying Indiana law, the Goldberg court observed that
119. Id.
120. In June 1988 Goldberg was in Amsterdam inspecting a Modigliani painting for a pro-
spective purchaser. When the deal fell through, the seller mentioned to Goldberg that he was
aware of four early Christian mosaics that were for sale. He told Goldberg that an archaeologist
found the mosaics in the rubble of an extinct church in northern Cyprus. Goldberg was impressed
by photographs of the mosaics and expressed her interest in purchasing the art. Goldberg claimed
she relied on export documentation that appeared to be in order, believed the mosaics had been
exported properly from Cyprus, and subsequently agreed to purchase the pieces for $1,080,000. Id.
at 1381-82.




125. Id. at 1383.
126. Id. at 1384.
127. Id. at 1385. In the fall of 1988 Goldberg contacted Dr. Geza von Habsburg, an art dealer
operating out of Geneva and New York, in an attempt to sell the mosaics. Dr. von Habsburg
subsequently contacted the Getty Museum in California to discuss whether the Getty would be
interested in the mosaics. The Getty explained that it did not collect Byzantine art and told von
Habsburg that because of its close working relationship with the Republic of Cyprus, it would be
notifying that country about the mosaics. Consequently, the Republic of Cyprus learned that the
mosaics were in Goldberg's possession in Indianapolis. Id. at 1384-85.




the applicable statute of limitations required the owner to commence
an action for recovery of stolen property within six years of accrual. 130
Goldberg claimed that the action accrued in 1979, when church and
government officials learned that the mosaics were missing, and thus
was barred by the six-year limitations period.131
Finding no Indiana case controlling the issues of when the statute
of limitations begins to run and whether it has been tolled in an action
for replevin of valuable artwork, the Goldberg court predicted how an
Indiana court would resolve these issues." 2 In making this determina-
tion, the district court stated that it was unnecessary to inquire whether
Goldberg was a bona fide purchaser.'33 The court apparently overlooked
precedent that emphasizes the importance of this distinction in Indi-
ana.13 4 Indiana clearly requires demand of the innocent purchaser by
the true owner in replevin actions for personal property. 35
The Indiana Supreme Court squarely confronted this issue in
Wood v. Cohen.13 In Wood the plaintiff sought recovery of a horse
from a bona fide purchaser who had acquired the horse from an alleged
thief. 37 The supreme court noted that although a thief would be liable
upon conversion, the owner could not maintain an action to recover the
property against a good faith purchaser until the owner first demanded
the property's return.13 8 Consistent with this demand requirement, the
Indiana Supreme Court later held in Torian v. McClure"9 that the stat-
ute of limitations does not begin to run in a replevin action until the
true owner has demanded return of the property. 40 Indiana courts con-
sistently have adhered to the demand requirement established in
130. Id. The Indiana Code provides, in relevant part: "The following actions shall be com-
menced within six [6] years after the cause of action has accrued, and not afterwards. . [F]or
recovering possession of personal property." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-1 (Burns 1986).
131. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1385.
132. Id. at 1388.
133. Id. at 1399 n.22.
134. See, e.g., Wood v. Cohen, 6 Ind. 455 (1855).
135. See id. at 456.
136. Id. at 455.
137. Id. at 455-56.
138. Id. at 456.
139. 83 Ind. 310 (1882).
140. In Torian the plaintiff sought recovery of a piano that he had rented to one Marsailles
in June 1871. Marsailles, without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent, sold the piano in May 1872
to an innocent purchaser who claimed it as his own. The defendant-purchaser paid valuable con-
sideration, without any notice of defective title, and retained possession of the piano for over six
years. Holding that Indiana's six-year statute of limitations did not bar the plaintiff's action, which
commenced in November 1878, the court declared that the limitations period does not begin to run
against a bona fide purchaser in replevin actions until the true owner has demanded return of the
property. Id. at 311.
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Wood.141 By contrast, Indiana follows the majority view that demand is
unnecessary when possession is obtained wrongfully.142
The Goldberg court sidestepped the distinction between innocent
purchaser and wrongful possessor by reasoning that because even a
bona fide purchaser cannot acquire title to stolen goods, Goldberg's
possession was inherently wrongful. 143 The district court perceived a
bona fide purchaser's alleged wrongful possession as the linchpin in the
accrual determination. 4 4 This inference departs from the Indiana Su-
preme Court's presumption that an innocent purchaser should be given
the opportunity to surrender possession of illegally obtained merchan-
dise without first being subjected to a lawsuit. 45
In the district court's defense, the tenor of its opinion suggests that
if it had perceived a bona fide purchase inquiry necessary for an accrual
determination, then the court may have found that the suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding the sale precluded Goldberg from attaining in-
nocent purchaser status. 146 Under these circumstances the court's
implicit assumption that wrongful possession is sufficient to trigger the
running of the limitations period would be appropriate.
Nevertheless, the Goldberg court ignored this distinction and spec-
ulated how an Indiana court would determine what it perceived as a
case of first impression. 47 In attempting to determine when an action
141. See, e.g., Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc., 221 Ind. 47, 46 N.E.2d 243 (1942); Conner v.
Comstock, 17 Ind. 90 (1861); Sherry v. Picken, 10 Ind. 375 (1858); Ledbetter v. Embree, 12 Ind.
App. 617, 40 N.E. 928 (App. Ct. 1895).
142. See, e.g., Jones v. Smith, 123 Ind. 585, 24 N.E. 368 (1889); Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind.
437 (1882); Robinson v. Shatzley, 75 Ind. 461 (1881) (all stating that demand is unnecessary when
possession is fraudulent or otherwise wrongful); see also Haffner v. Barnard, 123 Ind. 429, 24 N.E.
152 (1889) (stating that it is only in cases in which one has lawful possession that a demand is
necessary to maintain replevin action); 51 AM. JuL 2D Limitation of Actions § 124 (1970) (stating
general rule that statute of limitations begins to run against owner of lost or stolen property at the
time of wrongful possession).
143. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1398-99. Interestingly, the district court bolstered this conclu-
sion of law by quoting text from the Torian opinion, stating that the thief, "at the time he sold the
piano to the defendant, had no title thereto, and could confer none on the defendant, and that the
plaintiff is the owner thereof." Id. at 1398 (quoting Torian, 83 Ind. at 311). Yet, the Goldberg court
overlooked the language immediately following this quotation, stating that "the statute of limita-
tions, which bars an action for the recovery of personal property, did not begin to run against the
plaintiff until a demand was made on the defendant for the return of the property, which was
refused by the defendant." Torian, 83 Ind. at 311.
144. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1398.
145. The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that when an innocent purchaser has purchased
property from a thief, "the law indulges that [he] will, upon demand, surrender it to the person
entitled thereto and that he ought to be afforded an opportunity so to do without being subjected
to the inconvenience and expense of a lawsuit." Butler, 221 Ind. at 50, 46 N.E.2d at 244.
146. Indeed, the Goldberg court reached this conclusion in a separate section of the opinion
by applying Swiss law, despite the Swiss presumption that a purchaser acts in good faith.
Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1400-04.
147. Id. at 1388.
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to recover personal property accrues, the Goldberg court noted Indi-
ana's strong policy in favor of statutes of limitations.14' The Goldberg
court also addressed the effect of the discovery rule on the Indiana stat-
ute of limitations. 14 9 Under the discovery rule, a cause of action in tort
cases accrues upon discovery of the injury by the plaintiff.150 Relying on
another supreme court decision, the Goldberg court noted that Indiana
had applied the discovery rule in a suit brought by a patient who dis-
covered an injury caused by a contraceptive device several years after
insertion.15' The Indiana Supreme Court, in Barnes v. A.H. Robbins
Co.,1 52 held that the discovery rule applied, and the statute of limita-
tions commences on the date the plaintiff knew or should have discov-
ered that she suffered an injury caused by an act of another. 153 The
Goldberg court determined that Indiana's adoption of the discovery
rule in Barnes and the stated policies supporting the rule indicated In-
diana's willingness to extend it to other circumstances. 15 4
In attempting to predict how Indiana would determine this issue,
the Goldberg court also was influenced heavily by a New Jersey deci-
sion addressing a similar dispute. 5 In O'Keeffe v. Snyder 56 painter
Georgia O'Keeffe filed suit to recover several pieces of her work.
O'Keeffe claimed the paintings were stolen in 1946, but that she did not
learn of their location until 1976, whereupon she filed suit to recover
the artwork .157 The defendant contended that a six-year statute of lim-
itations barred O'Keeffe's action.158 In determining whether O'Keeffe
filed the action in a timely manner, the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
viewed its applications of the discovery rule. The O'Keeffe court noted
148. Specifically, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated, "the judicial attitude is in favor of
statutes of limitations. . . since they are considered as statutes of repose and as affording security
against stale claims. . . . They are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded
claim will not delay in enforcing it." Id. at 1385 (citing Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 273, 417
N.E.2d 281, 283 (1981)).
149. Id. at 1386-88.
150. Id. at 1386.
151. Id. (citing Barnes v. A. H. Robins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84, 85 (Ind. 1985)).
152. 476 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. 1985).
153. Id. at 87-88.
154. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1387. In Barnes the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
Many jurisdictions have responded to the problems presented by this type of case by adopt-
ing a "discovery rule." The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations in this type
of cause runs from the date the negligence was or should have been discovered. The rule is
based on the reasoning that it is inconsistent with our system of jurisprudence to require a
claimant to bring his cause of action in a limited period in which, even with due diligence, he
could not be aware a cause of action exists.
Barnes, 476 N.E.2d at 86.
155. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1388.
156. 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
157. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.
158. Id. at 483, 416 A.2d at 864-65.
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that it had adopted the rule in the area of medical malpractice and
then extended it to other contexts."6 9 To mitigate unjust results, the
O'Keeffe court concluded that the discovery rule likewise should apply
to replevin actions involving stolen art.160 Therefore, the court held that
O'Keeffe's action accrued when she first knew, or reasonably should
have known through the exercise of due diligence, of the cause of ac-
tion, including the identity of the possessor of the paintings.' 6'
The Goldberg court was persuaded that Indiana would likewise ex-
tend the discovery rule in actions to recover stolen artwork. 62 The
court stated that the discovery rule prevents the statute of limitations
from commencing in situations in which the owner, using due diligence,
cannot bring a suit because the location of the stolen artwork is un-
known.163 Citing DeWeerth v. Baldinger6  the district court concluded
that an owner who seeks protection under the discovery rule has a duty
to use reasonable diligence to locate the stolen artwork.'
Implicitly, the district court assumed that, absent adoption of the
discovery rule, the statute of limitations in Indiana would begin to run
against the true owner upon a subsequent purchaser's possession of
stolen property. The Goldberg court believed that the Republic of Cy-
prus actually would benefit by a postponement of the running of the
limitations period under the discovery rule. 66 Had the district court
concluded properly that the limitations period would not begin to run
against a bona fide purchaser until the true owner demanded return of
the artwork, extension of the discovery rule may have been unneces-
sary. Indeed, if the court had deemed Goldberg to be an innocent pur-
chaser, the due diligence requirement would have had the unintended
effect of expediting accrual, a result that otherwise would not have oc-
curred until the owner demanded return of the stolen art. Acting under
the district court's assumption that demand is categorically unnecessary
in Indiana, the practical effect of the Goldberg decision is to illustrate
-how the due diligence requirement would apply in those states in which
159. Id. at 491, 416 A.2d at 869.
160. Id. at 493, 416 A.2d at 870.
161. Id.
162. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1388.
163. Id. at 1389.
164. 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988).
165. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1389.
166. See id. at 1388 (declaring that statute of limitations would not commence until "the
plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known who possessed the mosaics"). As discussed previ-
ously, had the district court recognized the importance of this distinction, it may have concluded
that Goldberg was not in fact a bona fide purchaser. In that event, the discovery rule properly




accrual ordinarily would occur upon wrongful possession by innocent
purchasers as well as wrongful possessors.
In applying its newly formulated rule, the Goldberg court regarded
the determination of due diligence as fact sensitive, requiring a case-by-
case application. 167 After reviewing the search efforts taken by the Re-
public of Cyprus,"6 8 the court concluded that Cyprus had satisfied the
due diligence requirement in its efforts to locate the missing mosaics.16 9
Therefore, the district court found that the action did not accrue in this
case, until late 1988, when the Republic of Cyprus knew or should have
known the identity of the possessor of the mosaics. '0 Indiana's six-year
limitations period accordingly did not bar the action.' 7'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT
Historically, two opposing judicial policies have rationalized con-
flicting accrual interpretations in replevin actions brought against good
faith purchasers. 172 The emergence of the due diligence requirement
should narrow this gap in stolen art cases. The Goldberg decision illus-
trates how the due diligence requirement should modify current accrual
determinations in states that do not require demand. In these jurisdic-
tions, the due diligence requirement embodied in the discovery rule
should give true owners of stolen artwork more protection by delaying
accrual of a cause of action that otherwise would occur upon the good
faith purchaser's possession. Instead, accrual should not occur until the
original owner, using due diligence, locates, or reasonably should have
located, the possessor of the artwork. 73 Thus, the due diligence require-
ment will extend the period during which an original owner may bring a
replevin action. This interpretation of the date of accrual is consistent
with the view in these states that a good faith purchaser's status is that
of a wrongdoer.174
The due diligence requirement has the opposite effect in demand
jurisdictions, generating additional burdens on original owners of stolen
art. Rather than accruing upon actual demand and refusal, an owner's
action will accrue when he, through diligent search, reasonably should
have located the possessor and made a demand for return of the prop-
167. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1389.
168. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
169. Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1389.
170. Id. at 1391.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
173. See Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1388 (employing the due diligence approach).
174. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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erty.175 Thus, if the law imposes a duty of diligent search on the true
owner, accrual is accelerated. Whereas an actual demand previously was
required before the limitations period could commence, failure to exer-
cise due diligence also may cause the limitations period to run. The
court now may impute demand and thereby reduce the period during
which the original owner may bring a replevin action. This accrual de-
termination is consonant with the underlying judicial policy in these
states that a good faith purchaser is an innocent party.176
Consequently, the due diligence standard should represent a me-
dian, protecting both the innocent purchaser and the true owner and
thereby develop a more uniform accrual construction. On a practical
level, this development should provide a clearer guide to owners of
stolen art in replevin actions. The owner must exercise due diligence in
effecting a search for the stolen art.
At least one commentator has criticized the due diligence rule be-
cause of the potential for inconsistent application. 77 This appraisal fo-
cuses on the context of stolen art. It anticipates divergent judicial
application of the rule in cases involving large, institutional plaintiffs
and suits brought by small, individual plaintiffs, as each class of owner
faces varying, often unreliable, avenues of investigation. 78 The due dili-
gence rule arguably compels courts to make value judgments in an ar-
ray of unfamiliar factual settings.'79 These criticisms, however, miss
their mark.
The concern for inconsistent application of the due diligence stan-
dard in varying factual settings seems less disturbing than inconsistent
rules of law that historically have faced both original owners and good
faith purchasers of stolen art. Prior to the extension of the due dili-
gence requirement an owner's obligations were unknown and often de-
termined by the laws of a distant jurisdiction.8 0 Uniform adoption of
the due diligence requirement would provide some degree of consis-
tency to this dilemma.
Moreover, the due diligence requirement, like all legal standards,
175. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108-10, (2d Cir. 1987) (applying the due dili-
gence standard), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
176. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Note, supra note 11, at 938 (stating that inconsistency may result from apply-
ing a rigid standard of due diligence despite practical distinctions between institutional and indi-
vidual plaintiff-owners).
178. See id. at 939.
179. See Wertheimer, The Implications of the O'Keeffe Case, 6 ART & THE LAW 44, 46
(1981); Note, supra note 11, at 938-42.
180. See Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at 1393-94 (stating that the law of Indiana and not Swiss




turns on the particular facts of each case. Factual settings vary and will
differ dramatically in stolen art cases.""1 Yet attacking the due diligence
requirement because it arises in unfamiliar circumstances is in reality
an assault on the competency of courts to apply a legal standard. Natu-
rally, application of any legal standard requires judicial sensitivity to
ensure fairness and equity in the adjudication of claims. Arguably, the
courts are capable of answering this charge. 8 '
Other commentators disapprove of the imposition of the due dili-
gence requirement on innocent owners without demanding a similar
level of care from buyers. 188 This evaluation suggests that courts should
require a reciprocal duty of buyers to ensure that they are not purchas-
ing stolen artwork.'' Moreover, this objection implies that courts do
not compel buyers to investigate the origins of potential purchases.
In fact, buyers generally are not relieved of taking reasonable pre-
cautions to verify title or the proper authority of the seller.8 5 Courts
usually require such efforts as a prerequisite to attaining good faith
purchaser status.' Recently, courts have recognized that the unique
nature of art warrants owners to effect a diligent investigation into the
whereabouts of stolen pieces.187 As the DeWeerth court noted, art is
commonly kept in private collections, unadvertised and unavailable to
the public. 8 As a result, locating stolen art usually is attributable to
181. See generally DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103; Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,
678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'g 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Goldberg, 717 F. Supp. at
1374; O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 478, 416 A.2d at 862.
182. For example, in negligence actions courts define the requisite standard of care as that
care which an ordinary person should have exercised under the circumstances. See Sturdivant v.
Polk, 140 Ga. App. 152, 230 S.E.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1976). Presumably, courts are well-equipped to
apply the due diligence standard in the same fashion.
183. See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 179, at 46.
184. Id.
185. See Horton, How to Improve Standing as Good-Faith Art Buyer, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13,
1990, at 5, col. 1.
186. See id. (citing Taborsky v. Maroney, No. 83-2533 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 1984); Porter v.
Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141. 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 421 N.E.2d 500,
439 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1981)). Good faith status is critical when artwork is purchased from a seller who
has voidable title, i.e., the seller is in lawful possession but unauthorized to sell the artwork. See
id. In this situation, by achieving good faith status a purchaser may defeat an owner's claim to the
artwork. Id. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, buyer-dealers must inquire about the nature of
the seller's authority and history of the artwork to achieve good faith status. See id. (citing U.C.C.
§§ 1-201(9), 2-403(2) (1990)).
By contrast, a thief has void title and cannot pass title, good or voidable, even to a good faith
purchaser. Id. In this instance, a purchaser can be assured of legal title only upon expiration of the
owner's right to recovery. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Therefore, even in stolen art
cases, good faith status may be important because this distinction affects accrual determinations in
some jurisdictions. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.




investigation rather than to chance.'89 Moreover, valuable works of art,
unlike fungible personal goods, tend to be unique and memorable.
While investigative efforts may prove fruitless nonetheless, the duty of
due diligence properly is placed on the owner who, with internal knowl-
edge of the theft, can mount the most efficient search.
The importance of limitations statutes in stolen art cases also sup-
ports the due diligence requirement. Even a good faith purchaser typi-
cally cannot be assured of legal title until the expiration of the owner's
right to recovery. 190 Because a primary purpose of statutes of limita-
tions is to punish dilatory behavior, imposition of the due diligence bur-
den on the owner is particularly appropriate. By adopting the due
diligence requirement, courts send an effective message to owners of
stolen art: the right to maintain a recovery action is circumscribed by
the duty to act prudently.
V. CONCLUSION
In adopting the due diligence requirement in Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., '9 the Southern District of Indiana has strengthened the hold of
this obligation in stolen art cases. As a result, owners of lost art will
benefit from a clearer understanding of their legal obligations in re-
plevin actions for stolen artworks. Owners of stolen art simply must ex-
ercise due diligence in effecting a search to locate and recover their
property. 92 Good faith purchasers likewise will benefit from the due
diligence requirement, directing courts to a more consistent interpreta-
tion of the buyer's primary defense in these actions: the statute of limi-
tations. While determination of due diligence is fact sensitive and must
be made on a case-by-case basis,193 uniform application of this obliga-
tion will be aided by judicial appreciation for the circumstances unique
to each owner-plaintiff in these replevin actions.
. This Recent Development suggests that the Goldberg decision cre-
ates important precedent for other jurisdictions by defining the due dil-
igence obligation of owners of lost art. The due diligence requirement is
compelling particularly in the context of stolen art because original
owners are uniquely situated to mount an effective search. Although the
Goldberg court may have misinterpreted Indiana law, the opinion rec-
.ognizes that the due diligence requirement properly allocates investiga-
189. Id.
190. See supra note 186.
191. 717 F. Supp. at 1374.
192. See id. at 1389.
193. Id.
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tive costs to the one who possesses the right to initiate legal proceedings
to recover stolen art: the true owner.
Stephen L. Foutty

